For most of us, the internet feels like something grounded: undersea cables, mobile towers, fibre lines running across cities. But increasingly, the real battleground for connectivity isn’t beneath our feet. It’s above our heads, in low Earth orbit.
Thousands of satellites are being placed into the sky, building what are called “megaconstellations,” with the promise of an internet that works anywhere on Earth, from a Himalayan village to a fishing boat in the Pacific.
And at the heart of this new race are two familiar rivals: Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which operates Starlink, and China, which has unveiled plans for two massive satellite networks called Guowang and Qianfan.
On paper, the scale of China’s ambition dwarfs even Starlink. But in reality, the gap between ambition and achievement is wide. And the outcome of this race could shape not just who has faster WiFi, but who controls the plumbing of global information flows.
When Starlink first launched, many dismissed it as one of Musk’s side projects. But today, it has quietly transformed global connectivity. With around 8,000 satellites already in orbit, SpaceX has built a network that provides high-speed internet across nearly every corner of the globe. It’s not just rural communities that benefit.
In the Russia-Ukraine war, Starlink became an unexpected military asset, keeping Ukrainian forces connected even when traditional networks collapsed. That episode underlined a deeper truth: satellite internet isn’t only about browsing speeds, it’s about national security, economic influence, and the ability to project power.
China was watching closely.
For Beijing, letting Starlink dominate global connectivity was not an option. That’s where Guowang and Qianfan come in. Guowang, meaning “national network,” aims to put more than 13,000 satellites into orbit. Qianfan has an even bigger target: 15,000 satellites. If both succeed, China would have nearly 30,000 satellites circling the planet, potentially overwhelming Starlink in sheer numbers.
The strategy is not just to build an alternative, but to build one at scale that rivals, and possibly outpaces, the American network.
But there’s a catch. As of mid-2025, China has launched fewer than 125 satellites for these megaconstellations. Guowang counts just 34, and Qianfan around 90. Worse, several of them failed to reach proper orbit. Compare that to SpaceX’s record: nearly 500 successful launches using its Falcon 9 rocket system, with a fresh batch of satellites sent up almost every week. The scoreboard, at least for now, is lopsided.
Why is China struggling to catch up?
The answer lies not in satellites themselves, but in the rockets that carry them.
SpaceX’s secret weapon has been reusability. The Falcon 9 can launch, return, and relaunch — dramatically reducing costs and turnaround time. It’s the equivalent of being able to reuse an aircraft after every trip, instead of scrapping it after a single flight.
China’s rockets, by contrast, are still mostly expendable. The Long March series has been the workhorse of the Chinese program, but it’s not reusable. Efforts to build reusable systems,like the Zhuque-3 from private company LandSpace or Tianlong-3 from Space Pioneer are underway, but none have achieved the kind of reliable performance that Falcon 9 has delivered for years.
Without reusability, China faces two big hurdles.
Launch costs remain high, and launch frequency remains limited.
Even if factories churn out satellites, the bottleneck is getting them into orbit quickly and cheaply. That’s why, despite announcing breathtaking plans, the actual pace of deployment is lagging far behind.
Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss China. Because the stakes here are far too big.
Low Earth orbit satellites aren’t just about giving remote villages internet access. They are the backbone of modern military systems from guiding drones to coordinating troops. They are critical for autonomous vehicles, logistics, and secure communications. And they are tools of soft power: offering internet packages to countries that may be uncomfortable relying on U.S. infrastructure.
Beijing has already started signing satellite internet deals with partners like Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan despite not yet having a fully functional network. These agreements are less about service today and more about geopolitics tomorrow. If Starlink represents an internet built on American terms, Guowang and Qianfan promise one on Chinese terms. And that difference matters.
Starlink, for all its flaws, carries an imprint of openness. It works in places where governments often prefer silence, and in wartime, it kept information flowing in ways that authoritarian states found threatening. China’s networks, by contrast, are being designed as dual-use systems.
Guowang satellites are heavier than Starlink’s, and rumours suggest they carry advanced radars, optical sensors, and inter-satellite lasers. That makes them capable of both civilian and military functions from the start. In other words, while Starlink stumbled into military relevance, Guowang is built with it in mind.
This raises a bigger question: what happens when countries can choose their satellite internet provider not based on price or speed, but based on ideology? Democracies might prefer networks that value openness, while authoritarian regimes could choose systems that enforce state control. The internet, once hailed as a unifying force, could fracture along geopolitical lines with rival constellations shaping not just access, but the rules of speech, privacy, and surveillance.
Timing adds another layer of urgency.
Under the rules of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), countries that secure rights to radio frequencies must launch at least half their planned satellites within five years. If they don’t, they risk losing their slot. For China’s megaconstellations, the clock is ticking.
By 2025–26, Beijing must show significant progress or face the possibility of scaling down its networks. That’s why the next 18 months are critical; either China cracks reusability and ramps up launches, or it risks losing ground permanently.
For the U.S., meanwhile, dominance is not guaranteed either. SpaceX has had its share of setbacks. Starship, Musk’s next-generation rocket, has faced repeated delays and explosive failures. Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos’ rival company, is still years away from operational readiness. And while SpaceX has revolutionised access to space, it also represents a single point of dependency. Critics argue that no strategic domain should rely so heavily on one man and one company.
So where does this leave the rest of the world?
For India, the lesson is clear. We cannot afford to sit out the orbital internet race. Our space sector has made significant strides from ISRO’s low-cost launch capabilities to private startups experimenting with small satellites and reusable launchers. The government has already greenlit projects like a ₹1,200 crore earth observation programme, and companies such as Bharti-backed OneWeb have put India in the global constellation conversation. But we are still dependent on foreign constellations like Starlink for satellite internet access. Musk’s company has been in licensing talks for India for over two years, and while Airtel’s OneWeb is operational in parts of the world, commercial rollout here remains limited.
If connectivity is the infrastructure of the future, sovereignty demands building it on our own terms. Imagine the stakes if tomorrow’s digital economy, defence networks, and even disaster relief communications were routed through systems controlled in Washington or Beijing. India’s private space ecosystem is young but buzzing with Skyroot, Agnikul, Pixxel and this is the moment to think beyond launches and imaging. A homegrown satellite internet constellation may sound ambitious, but then again, so did Chandrayaan and Aditya-L1 once.
The story of satellite internet is no longer about who can provide WiFi in remote corners. It’s about who controls the future of communication itself. China may be behind today, but its industrial muscle, political will, and long-term vision mean it cannot be counted out.
SpaceX may be ahead, but it faces its own risks of scaling and governance. What’s certain is that the internet wars of tomorrow will not be fought in cables under the sea but in constellations above our heads. And the side that wires the sky first will decide far more than just who streams YouTube faster. They’ll decide the rules of the information age and for India, the question is whether we’ll be users of someone else’s system, or builders of our own.
FAQs
What is a satellite megaconstellation?
A satellite megaconstellation is a large network of thousands of satellites placed in low Earth orbit to provide global internet coverage. SpaceX with Starlink and China with Guowang and Qianfan are building such systems to deliver connectivity everywhere, from remote villages to oceans.
How many satellites does Starlink have in orbit?
As of mid 2025, Starlink has around 8,000 satellites in orbit, making it the world’s largest operational satellite internet constellation. The company keeps adding new satellites almost weekly using its reusable Falcon 9 rockets.
Why is China building Guowang and Qianfan?
China is developing Guowang and Qianfan to avoid reliance on a U.S. network and to create its own global internet system. These constellations aim to serve civilian and military needs while giving China geopolitical influence through connectivity deals with partner nations.
How many satellites has China launched so far?
Despite plans for nearly 30,000 satellites, China has launched fewer than 125 as of 2025. Guowang has around 34 satellites, and Qianfan about 90, with several facing technical issues reaching proper orbit.
What makes SpaceX’s Falcon 9 a game changer?
Falcon 9 is reusable. It can launch, land, and relaunch multiple times. This slashes costs and boosts launch frequency, giving SpaceX a massive edge over rivals that still rely on expendable rockets.
Why does satellite internet matter beyond basic connectivity?
Satellite internet supports military operations, national security, logistics, autonomous vehicles, and emergency communications. In the Russia Ukraine war, Starlink kept Ukrainian forces connected when traditional networks failed.
What risks does China face in scaling its constellations?
China’s main constraints are non reusable rockets, higher launch costs, and limited cadence. Under ITU rules, it must launch at least half its planned satellites within five years or risk losing frequency rights, which adds time pressure.
How could satellite internet reshape geopolitics?
Countries may choose providers based on ideology, not just price or speed. Democracies may prefer more open networks like Starlink, while authoritarian regimes might adopt Chinese systems that enable tighter control and surveillance.
What is India’s position in the satellite internet race?
India has momentum through ISRO and startups like Skyroot and Agnikul. Bharti backed OneWeb gives a global stake, but a fully homegrown constellation is still missing. Building one would strengthen India’s digital sovereignty and resilience.
Who is likely to lead the future of satellite internet?
SpaceX currently leads with scale and reusability. China remains a serious challenger due to industrial capacity and political will. The winner will shape access and the rules of global information flows in the years ahead.